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Boycotting the Boycotters: Turnabout is Fair

Play Under the Commerce Clause and the
Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine
MARC A. GREENDORFER*
ABSTRACT
Organized boycotts are among the most powerful means of expressing
a viewpoint. Boycotts have become so prevalent and persuasive in
American politics and culture that many local and state governments have
adopted this form of expression as well, particularly through laws and
policies that prohibit state funds from being invested in, or spent to
contract with, parties whose actions the state finds objectionable. While
the First Amendment status of many boycotts has been robustly covered in
court opinions and scholarly works, the constitutionality of state and local
governments responding in kind with their own boycotts is not as well
understood.
Many commentators, and some litigants, take the position that state
boycott action violates, inter alia, the Dormant Commerce Clause and the
Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine,predicatedon what is often a false
belief that all boycott activity by non-state actors is absolutely protected
FirstAmendment expression.
This Article examines the intersection of state and local boycotts of
boycotters, on the one hand, and the Dormant Commerce Clause and
UnconstitutionalConditions Doctrine, on the other hand. One of the most
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contentious cases of states boycotting the boycotters involves state antidiscrimination laws designed to allow states to refuse to enter into
contracts with parties engaged in organized boycotts of Israel. This Article
takes an in-depth look at this particularboycott movement and state laws
enacted to deal with the discriminatoryintent and impact of those boycotts.
It finds that states are on firm constitutionalground in enacting laws that
boycott the boycotters.
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INTRODUCTION

At the time of this Article's publication, twenty-four states' (State
Regulators) have enacted laws or executive orders directed at limiting state
1. The states are Alabama (ALA. CODE § 41-16-5 (LexisNexis Supp. 2016)), Arizona
(ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 35-393 to -393.03 (Supp. 2016)), Arkansas (ARK. CODE
ANN. § 25-1-501 (West, Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.)), California (CAL. PUB. CONT.
CODE § 2010 (West 2017)), Colorado (COLO. REv. STAT. § 24-54.8-201 (2017)), Florida
(FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 215.4725, 287.135 (West Supp. 2017)), Georgia (GA. CODE
ANN. § 50-5-85 (Supp. 2017)), Illinois (40 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/1-110.16 (West Supp.
2017)), Indiana (IND. CODE ANN. §5-10.2-11-1 to-26 (West 2017)), Iowa (IowA
CODE § 12J.1 to 12J.7 (2017)), Kansas (Act of June 16, 2017, ch. 97, 2017 Kan. Sess. Laws
1126), Maryland (MD. Exec. Order No. 01.01.2017.25 (Oct. 23, 2017)) Michigan (MICH.
COMP. LAWs ANN. § 18.1261 (West, Westlaw through 2017 P.A.189)), Minnesota (MINN.
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contracts with or investments in entities that engage in boycotts against
Israel (State Anti-Boycott Laws). Similar in purpose to longstanding
federal anti-boycott law, 2 the State Anti-Boycott Laws are a legislative
response to the spread of a discriminatory movement that targets one
nationality, drawing American consumers and markets into a foreign
conflict.3 While the State Anti-Boycott Laws are each unique, and some
deal with the issue of boycotts against Israel in an indirect manner (e.g., by
limiting the law's applications to discriminatory boycotts generally rather
than boycotts against Israel specifically), they all have a similar effect. The
State Anti-Boycott Laws are structured to prohibit the respective State
Regulators from contracting with boycotting entities and/or require the
state to divest from such entities. Of the twenty-four State Regulators,
twelve have enacted laws that restrict the state from contracting with
boycotting entities (No Contracts Laws), 4 five require the state to divest
from investments in boycotting entities (Divestiture Laws),' and seven have
both No Contracts and Divestiture Laws.6
Some of the State Anti-Boycott Laws have been opposed by various
groups who claim that the laws violate the First Amendment, the
Commerce Clause, and the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine. The
§§ 3.226 and 16C.053 (West Supp. 2017), Nevada (NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
286 and 332-333 (West Supp. 2017), New Jersey (N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:18A-89.14 (West
Supp. 2017)), New York (N.Y. Exec. Order No. 157 (June 5, 2016)), North Carolina (Act of
Jun. 29, 2017, Sess. L. 2017-193, 2017-4 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 607 (West) (to be codified
at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 147-86.80)), Ohio (OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 9.76 (West, Westlaw
through 2017 File 23 of the 132nd Gen. Assemb.)), Pennsylvania (62 PA. STAT. AND CONS.
STAT. ANN. §§ 3601-3606 (West Supp. 2017)), Rhode Island (37 R.I. GEN.
LAWS §§ 37-2.6-1 to -4 (Supp. 2016)), South Carolina (S.C. CODE ANN. § 11-35-5300
(Supp. 2017)), Texas (TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. §§ 2270.001-2270.002 (West Supp. 2017)
and Wisconsin (Wis. Exec. Order No. 261 (Oct. 27, 2017)).
2. Export Administration Act of 1979 § 8, 50 U.S.C. § 2407 (2012).
3. See, e.g., H.B. 161 pmbl., 2017 Gen. Assemb. (N.C. 2017) (to be codified at N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 147-86.80) ("Whereas, companies that refuse to deal with United States trade
partners such as Israel, or entities that do business with or in such countries, make
discriminatory decisions on the basis of national origin that impair those companies'
commercial soundness....").
4. The states with "No Contracts Laws" are Alabama, California, Georgia, Kansas,
Michigan, Maryland, Minnesota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina and
Wisconsin.
5. The states with "Divestiture Laws" are Colorado, Illinois, Indiana, New Jersey, and
New York.
6. The states that have combined "No Contracts and Divestiture Laws" are Arizona,
Arkansas, Florida, Iowa, Nevada, North Carolina, and Texas.
7. See, e.g., Public Contracts: California Combating the Boycott, Divestment, and
Sanctions of Israel Act of 2016: Hearing on A.B. 2844 Before the Assemb. Comm. on
Judiciary, 2015-2016 Sess. (Cal. 2016); Letter from Sarah Wunsch, Deputy Legal Dir.,
STAT. ANN.
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author has previously examined the question of First Amendment
protections for the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) Movement,
finding that such protections are not applicable to BDS activity as they are
for traditional political speech relating to constitutional rights of the
speakers. 8 This Article examines the application of the Commerce Clause
and the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine to State Anti-Boycott Laws
and demonstrates that there are no such constitutional infirmities with the
laws.
Opponents of the State Anti-Boycott Laws claim that the laws are
unconstitutional because boycotts against Israel are protected political
speech connected to a civil rights movement. 9
This premise
mischaracterizes the boycott campaign and whitewashes its sordid birth and
evolution. The State Anti-Boycott Laws were enacted in response to the
spread of discriminatory boycotts that targeted companies doing business in
Israel, often with the stated goal of eliminating the state of Israel
altogether.'0 This "BDS Movement" was conceived by state sponsors of
terrorism as part of a plan to reinvigorate and weaponize the Arab League's
boycott of Israel and companies doing business with and within Israel, with

ACLU of Mass., to Co-Chairs and Members of the Joint Comm. on State Admin. and
Regulatory Oversight (July 11, 2017) (stating ACLU's opposition to bills that prohibited
discrimination in state contracts); Letter from Bradley A. Smith, Chairman, Ctr. For
Competitive Politics, & David Keating, President, Ctr. For Competitive Politics, to
Governor Andrew M. Cuomo regarding Exec. Order No. 157 (June 16, 2016) [hereinafter
Cuomo Letter] (stating that Exec. Order No. 157 is unconstitutional).
8. Marc A. Greendorfer, The Inapplicabilityof FirstAmendment Protections to BDS
Movement Boycotts, 2016 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 112 (2016) [hereinafter BDS and the
First Amendment].
9. See, e.g., Complaint at 1, Koontz v. Watson, No. 5:17-cv-04099 (D. Kan. Oct. 11,
2017) (arguing that participation in BDS boycotts is protected political speech).
10. For a detailed discussion of the BDS Movement, see Marc A. Greendorfer, The
BDS Movement: That Which We Call a ForeignBoycott, by Any Other Name, Is Still Illegal,
22 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 1 (2017)). See also the state recitals to their respective State
Anti-Boycott Laws. New Jersey, for example, has the following as a legislative finding:
The State is deeply concerned about the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions
(BDS) effort to boycott Israeli goods, products, and businesses which is contrary
to federal policy articulated in numerous laws.
Nationality-based boycott actions are often veiled discrimination, and it is
against the public policy of New Jersey to support such discrimination.
Boycotts, such as those against Israel, do not make for effective business
decision making, prevent a business from making the best use of the resources
available to it and should be opposed as an impairment to the soundness of
commercial contracting performance.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:18A-89.13 (West Supp. 2017) (emphasis added).
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the ultimate goal of weakening, marginalizing, and then destroying Israel."
Far from being a civil rights movement engaged in protected political
speech, the BDS Movement is an extremist tool designed to turn American
commercial markets, educational institutions, and cultural establishments
into a new front in a foreign conflict.' 2 Whether American BDS Movement
supporters are aware of the true nature and goals of the movement is
irrelevant to the analysis of the constitutionality of the State Anti-Boycott
Laws.
This Article begins by providing a background on the emergence of
State Anti-Boycott Laws. Part II of this Article explains that these laws are
not susceptible to challenges under the Commerce Clause because they fit
within the Market Participant Exemption. Part III explains how these laws
do not violate the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, principally
because no protected First Amendment rights are affected by the laws and
because citizens are free to continue their boycott efforts. Finally, this
Article concludes that State Anti-Boycott Laws are a constitutionally valid
exercise of the state's authority to regulate its own participation in
commercial markets and such choices do not violate protected
constitutional rights of those engaged in BDS Movement boycotts.
I.

BACKGROUND ON THE STATE ANTI-BOYCOTT LAWS

In recent years, a discriminatory boycott movement focused on Israel
has spread through the United States.' 3 The movement is multifaceted and
11. See infra Part III.
12. See, e.g., Impact of the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions Movement: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Nat ' Sec. of the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov't Reform, 114th

Cong. 10 (2015) (written testimony of Professor Eugene Kontorovich, Northwestern
University School of Law (available at https://perma.cc/T3AQ-YPRN) [hereinafter
Kontorovich Testimony] ("Thus the so-called 'Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions'
campaign is not some grass-roots effort initiated by 'Palestinian civil society' in 2005, but a
well organized campaign, backed by U.N. agencies and often funded by European
governments, that picks up where the Arab League boycott left off .... This is simply the
economic parallel of the move from traditional state vs. state warfare to warfare through
guerilla and other unorganized groups.").
13. See generally U.S. BDS Victories, U.S. CAMPAIGN FOR PALESTINIAN RTS.,
https://uscpr.org/campaign/bds/bdswins/ (last visited Dec. 9, 2017). While the results of the
commercial boycott are difficult to quantify, the academic and cultural boycotts have had
tangible and damaging results. See Khalid Abdalla et al., Letter, Over 100 Artists Announce
a CulturalBoycott ofIsrael, GUARDIAN (Feb. 13, 2015, 11:51 AM), https://perma.cc/LH9HP5LJ; Judy Maltz, Jewish Group Releases Blacklist of U.S. Professors Who Back Academic
Boycott of Israel, HAARETZ (Mar. 30, 2017, 5:51 PM), https://perma.cc/F2PH-D38T; Peter
Walker & Ian Black, UK Academics Boycott Universities in Israel to Fightfor Palestinians'

Rights,

GUARDIAN

(Oct. 27, 2015, 5:20 AM), https://perma.cc/YF25-UGQQ.
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has called for commercial, academic, and cultural boycotts to varying
degrees of success. 14
Across American university campuses, BDS
Movement affiliates such as Students for Justice in Palestine, American
Muslims for Palestine, and the Muslim Students' Association have waged a
proxy war against Israel by vilifying, attacking, marginalizing, and
effectively silencing pro-Israel students, Jewish campus groups, academics
whose work is seen as supporting Israel, and speakers affiliated with Israel
or pro-Israel viewpoints. 15
States have taken notice and have been working to ensure that state
funds and resources are not used to promote or support those who foster
these campaigns. South Carolina was the first state to take legislative
action, enacting a No Contracts Law in 2015.16 The law's clear, concise,
and minimal language is emblematic of other No Contracts Laws enacted
around the country; it reads as follows:
(A) A public entity may not enter into a contract with a business to acquire
or dispose of supplies, services, information technology, or construction
unless the contract includes a representation that the business is not
currently engaged in, and an agreement that the business will not engage in,
the boycott of a person or an entity based in or doing business with a
jurisdiction with whom South Carolina can enjoy open trade, as defined in
this article.
(B) For purposes of this section:
(1) "Boycott" means to blacklist, divest from, or otherwise refuse to
deal with a person or firm when the action is based on race, color,
religion, gender, or national origin of the targetedperson or entity.
"Boycott" does not include:
(a) a decision based on business or economic reasons, or the
specific conduct of a targeted person or firm;
(b) a boycott against a public entity of a foreign state when
the boycott is applied in a nondiscriminatory manner; and
(c) conduct necessary to comply with applicable law in the
business's home jurisdiction.
(2) "Public entity" means the State, or any political subdivision of the
State, including a school district or agency, department, institution, or
other public entity of them.
14. U.S. BDS Victories, supra note 13.
15. See, e.g., Barry Kosmin, UCLA Student is Latest Victim of Anti-Semitism on

Campus, CNN (Mar. 10, 2015, 8:14 AM), https://perma.cc/37VN-RXMF; see also Perry
Chiaramonte, Pro-PalestinianStudents Bring Hate, Intimidation to Campus, Critics Say,
Fox NEWS (June 9, 2014), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2014/06/09/pro-palestinianstudents-bring-hate-intimidation-to-campus-critics-say.html (last visited Dec. 13, 2017).
16. S.C. CODE ANN. § 11-35-5300 (Supp. 2017) (effective since June 4,2015).
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(3) A "jurisdiction with whom South Carolina can enjoy open trade"
includes World Trade Organization members and those with which
the United States has free trade or other agreements aimed at ensuring
open and nondiscriminatory trade relations.

(C) This section does not apply if a business fails to meet the requirements
of subsection (A) but offers to provide the goods or services for at least
twenty percent less than the lowest certifying business. Also, this section
does not apply to contracts with a total potential value of less than ten
thousand dollars. 17
The most important thing to note when reviewing this and other No
Contracts Laws is that the laws only apply to the expenditure of state
funds.' 8 The laws do not regulate the conduct of private citizens and do not
prohibit any person from engaging in boycott activity. Individual residents
of a state with a No Contracts Law are free to contract with boycotting
entities, even if the law prohibits the state from doing so.
Likewise, the law only applies to specific conduct and not speech.
That is, if a person were to speak out against Israel, that person would still
be eligible to contract with the state. The law says, in essence, that if a
party chooses to engage in conduct that the state considers discriminatory,
the state will not enter into a contract with that party. 19
The Divestiture Laws are more complex than the No Contracts Laws
but, in function, are similarly discrete and focused on specific conduct,
rather than speech. New Jersey's Divestiture Law is a good representation:
a. ... no assets of any pension or annuity fund under the jurisdiction of
the Division of Investment in the Department of the Treasury, or its
successor, shall be invested in any company that boycotts the goods,
products, or businesses of Israel, boycotts those doing business with Israel,
or boycotts companies operating in Israel or Israeli-controlled territory.
This section shall not apply to those boycotts organized by foreign
governments pursuant to 50 U.S.C. s.4607(c).
The activities of any

17. Id. (emphasis added).
18. Id. § 11-35-5300(A). All of the No Contracts Laws have similar limiting language
to ensure that the prohibition on contracts applies only to state, rather than private party,
contracting.
19. See, e.g., Act of Sept. 24, 2016, §§ I(j)-(k), 2016 Cal. Stat. 4023, 4025 (West 2016)
(codified at CAL. PUB. CONT. CODE § 2010 historical and statutory notes) ("(j) It is the intent
of the Legislature to ensure that taxpayer funds are not used to do business with or otherwise
support any state or private entity that engages in discriminatory actions against individuals
under the pretext of exercising First Amendment rights. This includes, but is not limited to,
discriminatory actions taken against individuals of the Jewish faith under the pretext of a
constitutionally protected boycott or protest of the State of Israel. (k) It is the intent of the
Legislature to ensure that taxpayer funds are not used to do business with or support
discriminatory actions against any individuals.").
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company solely providing humanitarian aid to the Palestinian people
through either a governmental or non-governmental organization shall not
render the company subject to the provisions of this act ... unless it is also
engaging in the prohibited boycotts or otherwise discriminating against
goods, products, or businesses of Israel, or entities operating in Israel or
Israeli-controlled territory.
b. The State Investment Council and the Director of the Division of
Investment shall take appropriate action to sell, redeem, divest, or withdraw
any investment held in violation of subsection a. of this section. This
section shall not be construed to require the premature or otherwise
imprudent sale, redemption, divestment, or withdrawal of an investment,
but such sale, redemption, divestment, or withdrawal shall be20 completed
not later than 24 months following the effective date of this act.
Like the No Contracts Laws, Divestiture Laws do not prohibit speech
and only apply to the investment of state funds. 2 ' Individual citizens of the
state are free to engage in any type of boycott activity, including boycotts
of Israel, without state interference. Moreover, individuals are free to
invest their own funds in boycotting companies that are subject to
divestiture. It bears repeating that the Divestiture Laws only apply to
investment of state funds. Furthermore, each state's Divestiture
contains a robust process for a company deemed to be engaged
prohibited boycott-and, thus, subject to divestiture-to contest
22
finding and appeal for removal from the state's divestiture list.

state
Law
in a
this

Generally, the Divestiture Laws only apply to entities that issue
publicly traded securities.2 3 In addition, some states' laws also apply to
securities issued through private placements or those that are otherwise
exempt from securities laws and thus not considered publicly traded, even

20. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:18A-89.14 (West Supp. 2017) (emphasis added).
21. See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 12J.1 (2017) ("The general assembly is deeply concerned
and does not support boycotts and related tactics that have become a tool of economic
warfare that threaten the sovereignty and security of allies and trade partners of the United
States, including the state of Israel. Therefore, the general assembly intends that statefunds
andfunds administeredby the state, includingpublic employee retirementfunds, should not
be invested in, and public contracts should not be entered into with, companies that refuse to
engage in commerce with Israel and boycott Israel or persons doing business in Israel or
territories controlled by Israel." (emphasis added)).
22. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. §24-54.8-202(3) (2017) (setting out a requirement that
the state agency first provide a company with written notice of potential divestment and give
the company a 180-day period with which to rebut the state's findings).
23. See, e.g., id. § 24-54.8-201(1) (defining a "Company" that may be subject to
divestment as an entity with "publicly traded securities"); IOWA CODE § 12J.2(1) (also
defining a "Company" that may be subject to divestment as an entity that is publicly traded).
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24
if held in the portfolios of institutions and public pension funds.
Moreover, the Divestiture Laws employ a narrowly tailored definition of
boycott activity. To wit, under most Divestiture Laws, a company's
boycott must be discriminatory, be politically motivated, be intended to
inflict economic harm, or infringe on commercial activity in order to
subject that company to divestiture.25

II.

STATE ANTI-BOYCOTT LAWS UNDER THE COMMERCE CLAUSE

While State Anti-Boycott Laws have enjoyed support from a diverse
group of organizations and individuals, some opponents have argued that
the laws violate the Constitution's Commerce Clause.26 Whether one
analyzes the State Anti-Boycott Laws under traditional Dormant
Commerce Clause theory or Foreign Commerce Clause theory, the
constitutionality of the laws remains on firm ground.
A.

The Dormant Commerce Clause and the Market Participant
Exemption

The Commerce Clause vests the federal government with the power to
regulate commerce among the states and, by extension, prohibits states
from creating barriers to interstate trade. 2 As the Supreme Court stated in
Freeman v. Hewit:

24. For example, the Florida Divestiture Law defines a "Company" that may be subject
to divestment as any entity that exists for the purpose of making a profit. FLA. STAT. ANN. §
215.4725(1)(b) (West Supp. 2017). Since the definition is not qualified to securities that are
publicly traded (which generally means a security that has been registered under securities
laws), and because many institutional investors invest in securities that have been issued in
transactions exempt from registration under applicable securities laws, the Florida law
effectively subjects to divestment non-publicly traded securities held directly or indirectly
by Florida's public funds.
25. See CoLO. REv. STAT. § 24-54.8-201(3) (defining "Economic prohibitions against
Israel" as actions that are politically motivated); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 215.4725(1)(a) (defining
"Boycott" as one that is conducted in a discriminatory manner); GA. CODE
ANN. § 50-5-85(a)(1)(B) (Supp. 2017) (defining "Boycott" as one that discriminates on the
basis of, inter alia, nationality or national origin).
26. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. In particular, the "Dormant Commerce Clause" (that
is, the doctrine that a state cannot impose regulations that interfere with interstate
commerce) is invoked by opponents of the State Anti-Boycott Laws. See, e.g., JIM ZANOTTI
ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44281, ISRAEL AND THE BOYCOTT, DIVESTMENT, AND
SANCTIONS (BDS) MOVEMENT 25-26 (2017) [hereinafter CRS BDS REPORT]. It has also
been argued that the State Anti-Boycott Laws violate the "Foreign Commerce" regulation
provision of the Commerce Clause. Id.
27. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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[T]he Commerce Clause was not merely an authorization to Congress to
enact laws for the protection and encouragement of commerce among the
States, but by its own force created an area of trade free from interference
by the States. In short, the Commerce Clause even without implementing
28
legislation by Congress is a limitation upon the power of the States.
Under the Commerce Clause, a state cannot regulate in a way that
clearly creates a barrier to trade, such as by imposing fees on out-of-state
products coming into the state; 29 however, when the state is acting as a
participant in the market, it is free from such restrictions.30 In Hughes v.
Alexandria Scrap Corp., the Supreme Court examined a state program that
encouraged recycling of cars registered in the state and imposed more
stringent requirements on out-of-state recyclers. 3' The Court held that
because the state was acting on its own behalf to increase the price for
junked cars in the state (and thus encouraging recycling of those cars),
rather than as a regulator of commerce among and between states, there
was no violation of the Commerce Clause.3 2 This became known as the
"Market Participant" Doctrine. From Hughes came the general proposition
that when a state is acting in its proprietary capacity to spend or invest state
funds in a manner that comports with the economic or ideological
sentiments of its citizens, such action does not violate the Commerce
Clause."
However, if a state operates outside of its proprietary capacity in the
34
market to act as a regulator, it is subject to Commerce Clause limitations.
In White v. Massachusetts Council of Construction Employers, Justice

Rehnquist succinctly summarized the rule as:
If the city is a market participant, then the Commerce Clause establishes no
barrier to conditions such as these which the city demands for its
28. Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 252 (1946) (citing S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325
U.S. 761 (1945); then citing Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373 (1946)), overruled on other
grounds by Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
29. See Chem. Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 339-42 (1992); see also City
of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 628 (1978); New Energy Co. of Ind. v.
Limbach, 486 U.S. 269,278-80 (1988).
30. Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 810 (1976).
31. Id. at 809-10.
32. Id.
33. See Michael Burger, "It's Not Easy Being Green": Local Initiatives, Preemption
Problems,and the Market ParticipantException, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 835, 846 (2010).

34. Hughes, 426 U.S. at 806 ("The common thread of all these cases is that the State
interfered with the natural functioning of the interstate market either through prohibition or
through burdensome regulation. By contrast, Maryland has not sought to prohibit the flow
of hulks, or to regulate the conditions under which it may occur. Instead, it has entered into
the market itself to bid up their price.").

https://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol40/iss1/1

10

Greendorfer: Boycotting the Boycotters: Turnabout Is Fair Play Under the Comme

2018]

BOYCOTTING THE BOYCOTTERS

participation. Impact on out-of-state residents figures in the equation only
after it is decided that the city is regulating the market rather than
participating in it, for only in the former case need it be determined whether
35
any burden on interstate commerce is permitted by the Commerce Clause.
The Supreme Court has reaffirmed (and, in fact, expanded) the Market
Participant Doctrine in subsequent cases.36 In Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, the
Court explained:
The basic distinction drawn in Alexandria Scrap between States as
market participants and States as market regulators makes good sense and
sound law.
As that case explains, the Commerce Clause responds
principally to state taxes and regulatory measures impeding free private
trade in the national marketplace. There is no indication of a constitutional
plan to limit the ability of the States themselves to operatefreely in thefree
market....
Restraint in this area is also counseled by considerations of state
sovereignty, the role of each State "as guardian and trustee for its people,"
and "the long recognized right of trader or manufacturer, engaged in an
entirely private business, freely to exercise his own independent discretion
as to parties with whom he will deal."
Moreover, state proprietary
activities may be, and often are, burdened with the same restrictions
imposed on private market participants. Evenhandedness suggests that,
when acting as proprietors, States should similarly share existing freedoms
from federal constraints, including the inherent limits of the Commerce
Clause. Finally, as this case illustrates, the competing considerations in
cases involving state proprietary action often will be subtle, complex,
politically charged, and difficult to assess under traditional Commerce
Clause analysis. Given these factors, Alexandria Scrap wisely recognizes
that, as a rule, the adjustment of interests in this context is a task better
3
suited for Congress than this Court.
The highlighted text above speaks to the core rationale of the Market
Participant Doctrine: each state, when acting in the market for its own
citizens, has the same right to make business decisions as any private party
would; the state acts, in effect, as a fiduciary for its citizens' interests. To
stifle this right would be a direct attack on that state's sovereignty, a fatal
blow to principles of federalism, and, thus, a violation of the clear limits on
federal power contained in the Constitution-one of the country's founding
principles.
The Commerce Clause was never meant to limit states'

35. White v. Mass. Council of Constr. Emp'rs, Inc., 460 U.S. 204, 210 (1983).
36. See, e.g., Dep't of Revenue v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 339-40 (2008); White, 460 U.S.
at 207 n.3; Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980).
37. Reeves, 447 U.S. at 438-39 (emphasis added) (footnotes and citations omitted)
(quoting Heim v. McCall, 239 U.S. 175, 191 (1915); then quoting United States v. Colgate
& Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919)).
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proprietary power, and the Supreme Court has consistently ruled
accordingly.3 8
Above and beyond the constitutional underpinnings of the Market
Participant Doctrine, as a policy matter, stripping state lawmakers of their
power to make purchasing and investing decisions would not only fail to
advance the intended goals of the Commerce Clause, it would effectively
deny the citizens of those states their rights to act through elected
representatives to further their own economic and ideological interests.
Indeed, absent a No Contracts Law, a state might be compelled to do
business with a party that offends the ideological interests of the state's
39
citizens if the party happens to be the lowest bidder for a contract.
Likewise, since state investment funds must be operated in accordance with
fiduciary standards, 40 a state without a Divestiture Law could be compelled
to invest in securities of a company that provides exceptional returns on
investment but acts in a manner opposed to the interests of the citizens of
that state. Such a result would do nothing to further the aims of the
Commerce Clause and would undermine the representative nature of state
and local political structures.
Though it is eminently clear that, under the Market Participant
Doctrine, states can enact Anti-Boycott Laws, one opponent of New York's
State Anti-Boycott Executive Order argued:
It is well established that, under the market participation doctrine, states
have the power to place certain conditions on state investments without
running afoul of the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Although
use of the state's proprietary activities to engage in socially activist
investing has been sharply criticized as poor trusteeship of public employee
pensions and state assets, ([as New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg
said,] "I don't think that we should be using the city's investments
policies ... to advance social goals, no matter how admirable those goals
are and no matter how much I believe in it[]")[,] such activist investing by
state governments is, within limits, constitutionally permissible.
[New York's Anti-Boycott Executive Order] goes further, however, by
specifically basing state investment decisions not only on whether a
company or other institution complies with state laws, but on a company's
38. See Burger, supra note 33, at 841.
39. See, e.g., CAL. PUB. CONT. CODE § 10306 (West 2017) ("If prior to making the
award, any bidder who has submitted a bid files a protest with the department against the
awarding of the contract or purchase order on the ground that he or she is the lowest
responsible bidder meeting specifications, the contract or purchase order shall not be
awarded until either the protest has been withdrawn or the department has made a final
decision as to the action to be taken relative to the protest."). Most, if not all, other states
have similar protest provisions for state contracts.
40. See JUN PENG, STATE AND LOCAL PENSION FUND MANAGEMENT 93-94 (2009).
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or institution's willingness to41 surrender its First Amendment rights as a
condition of state investment.

The argument is, at best, muddled. It starts with a discussion of the
Commerce Clause, even acknowledging that the Market Participant
Doctrine makes Divestiture Laws "constitutionally permissible,, 42 then
questions the Divestiture Laws under policy rather than legal
considerations, and then transitions into a non sequitur on the First
Amendment (a clumsy introduction to the totally separate Unconstitutional
Conditions Doctrine).

3

The Congressional Research Service was more successful in setting
out the Commerce Clause argument with the simple recitation of
Commerce Clause principles:
Under this established principle, states and localities are prohibited from
unreasonably burdening or discriminating against either interstate or
foreign commerce unless they are authorized by Congress to do
so ....[T]he [Supreme Court] has required a closer examination of

measures alleged to infringe the Foreign Commerce Clause than is required
for those alleged to infringe its interstate counterpart, but has also provided
some room for state measures in situations where a federal role is not
clearly demanded.4 4

The Congressional Research Service appropriately concluded that
measures like the Anti-Boycott Laws "may be defended on the ground that
the state or local government is merely making investment or purchasing
choices for
itself and not regulating other investors or buyers, as the case
45
be.",
may
In sum, looking at the State Anti-Boycott Laws under the Market
Participant Doctrine, it is clear that these laws do not violate the Commerce
Clause. The laws only apply to transactions where a State Regulator enters
the market to purchase products or services or invest in securities. The
laws have absolutely no regulatory effect on commerce. The only effect
they have is to disqualify certain parties from doing business with a state
when the state acts on its own account. Even the Department of Justice,
when considering whether state and local divestment laws relating to South
Africa violated the Dormant Commerce Clause, opined that such
divestment laws were "an exercise of proprietary power to spend or invest
41. Cuomo Letter, supra note 7 (citations omitted) (citing White, 460 U.S. at 210; then
citing Jon Entine, The Politicizationof Public Investments, in PENSION FUND POLITICS 1, 112 (Jon Entine ed., 2005)).
42. Id.
43. See infra Section III.B.
44. CRS BDS REPORT, supra note 26, at 25 (footnotes omitted).
45. Id.at 26.
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state funds in a manner that reflects [the state's] citizens' moral sentiments
or economic interests, and
accordingly ought to escape invalidation under
46
the Commerce Clause.,
B.

The Foreign Commerce Clause

Some have argued, as did the Congressional Research Service, that
Anti-Boycott Laws may violate the Foreign Commerce Clause. 47 This
argument is without basis. The Foreign Commerce Clause applies to
commercial activities with foreign nations and provides the federal
government with broad powers to override state laws that conflict with the
federal 48government's desire for a unified and consistent foreign commerce
policy.

The threshold question in any Foreign Commerce Clause inquiry is
49
whether there is an attempt to regulate commerce with foreign nations.
As the Supreme Court explained in Veazie v. Moor, "Commerce with
foreign nations[] must signify commerce which in some sense is
necessarily connected with these nations, transactions which either
immediately, or at some stage of their progress, must be extraterritorial."5
State Anti-Boycott Laws do not attempt to, nor do they actually, regulate
commerce with foreign nations. They only apply to domestic commerce in
46. Constitutionality of S. African Divestment Statutes Enacted by State and Local
Gov'ts, 10 Op. O.L.C. 49, 50 (1986). This Department of Justice opinion was drafted in
response to a wave of state and local divestment laws that were being enacted in response to
South African apartheid. See id.at 49. The Commerce Clause conclusions reached were
based primarily on the Department of Justice assuming the Supreme Court would find a
market participant exception for the Foreign Commerce Clause that would be similar in
effect to the exception for the Interstate Commerce Clause. Id at 52. In fact, however, the
Supreme Court has not found a Foreign Commerce Clause market participant exception in
the thirty-one years since the Department of Justice published this opinion. Because State
Anti-Boycott Laws only implicate the Interstate Commerce Clause, the Department of
Justice's rationale continues to be applicable. But, in the case of a state law that attempted
to impose such restrictions on contracts with or investments in a foreign country, subsequent
case law on the existence of a market participant exception to the Foreign Commerce Clause
(and other constitutional issues relating to foreign affairs, discussed infra) contradicts the
opinion of the Department of Justice that a state or locality can engage in divestment
campaigns against foreign governments or companies.
47. See CRS BDS REPORT, supra note 26, at 25-27.
48. See generally Anthony J. Colangelo, The Foreign Commerce Clause, 96 VA. L.
REv. 949, 959-66 (2010) (distinguishing between "inward-looking" power, i.e., the federal
government's power regarding state action that regulates commerce with foreign nations,
and "outward-looking" power, i.e., the federal government's power to regulate
extraterritorially).
49. See id.at 959.
50. Veazie v. Moor, 55 U.S. 568, 573 (1852).
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very specific situations-when a party seeks to contract with a state or
when a state invests in securities of a company. They do not prohibit a
state from contracting with foreign countries or foreign entities, nor do they
require divestment from the securities of foreign countries. Neither type of
the State Anti-Boycott Laws implicates foreign commerce.
C.

The Implicit Question: Can States or Local Governments Boycott
Israel?

A state law prohibiting state contracts with, or state investments in,
foreign nations would likely be subject to scrutiny under the Foreign
Commerce Clause. Such a law would have an extraterritorial effect and
cause potential conflicts with the federal government's power to conduct a
unified and consistent program of foreign affairs. Indeed, in Crosby v.
National Foreign Trade Council, the

Supreme

Court reviewed

a

Massachusetts state law that prohibited state agencies from purchasing
goods or services from companies that conducted business with Burma. 5'
The Court found that the law was preempted by subsequently enacted
federal law which established sanctions on Burma.52 Because the Court
found that the state law was preempted, it expressly declined to review the
Foreign Commerce Clause issue. 53 The lower court undertook that analysis
and found that the law was in violation of the Foreign Commerce Clause
because (i) the state was not acting as a market participant and (ii) itwas
unlikely that the market participant exception applied to Foreign
54
Commerce Clause cases even if the state was acting in such a capacity.
Thus, while State Anti-Boycott Laws do not violate the Commerce
Clause, a state law that imposed sanctions on Israel (either by prohibiting
the state from contracting with companies doing business with or in Israel
or a law that required the state to divest from investments in Israel or Israeli
companies) would unquestionably fail on numerous grounds.
First, federal law explicitly encourages commercial relations between
the United States and Israel and opposes all boycott and divestment
campaigns against Israel. 55 As the Supreme Court found in Crosby, where
51. Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 366 (2000).
52. Id. at 388.
53. Id. at 374 n.8 (stating that the lower court's decision was affirmed on the basis that
the state law presented an obstacle to the federal government's objectives and declining,
therefore, to address either the foreign affairs or Dormant Foreign Commerce Clause
arguments).
54. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 62-66 (1st Cir. 1999), aff'd
sub nom. Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000).
55. Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015 § 909, 19 U.S.C. §§
4452(b)(4)-(5) (Supp. 2017) ("Congress... (4) opposes politically motivated actions that
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a state law conflicts with an act of Congress, even if Congress did not
intend to "occupy the field," the state law is preempted under the
Supremacy Clause to the extent that it conflicts with federal law.5 6 A state
law that required divestment from, or a boycott of, Israel (either directly or
indirectly) would unambiguously conflict with the purposes of Congress set
forth in the federal law. The Supreme Court also made explicit in Crosby
that, while a market participant exemption applies in Commerce Clause
57
cases, there is no market participant exemption for pre-emption cases.
Second, it is well established that the foreign affairs power rests
exclusively with Congress and the president5 8 and that United States' law
and foreign policy oppose boycotts, sanctions, and divestment campaigns
against Israel.5 9 While the Court did not reach this question in Crosby, the
lower court did. 60 Applying the framework used by that court, state law
prohibiting commercial relations with Israel or Israeli companies, or
mandating divestment from Israel or Israeli companies, would be in
conflict with federal policy on commercial relations with Israel
and, thus,
61
invalid under the foreign affairs provisions of the Constitution.
Third, state or local laws restricting commerce with Israel would
violate the Foreign Commerce Clause for the same reasons that the lower
court discussed in Crosby: they would interfere with the federal
government's ability to speak with one voice and would regulate conduct
beyond the state's respective borders.62

penalize or otherwise limit commercial relations specifically with Israel, such as boycotts
of divestmentfrom, or sanctionsagainst Israel; (5) notes that boycotts of, divestment from,

and sanctions against Israel by governments, governmental bodies, quasi-governmental
bodies, international organizations, and other such entities are contrary to principle of
nondiscrimination under the [General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade] 1994 ....
(emphasis added)).
56. Crosby, 530 U.S. at 372 (citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 66-67 (1941);
then citing California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 100-01 (1989); and then citing
United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 109 (2000)).
57. See id. at 373 n.7.
58. See Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 436 (1968).
59. See 19 U.S.C. § 4452; see also Export Administration Act of 1979 § 8, 50 U.S.C. §
2407 (2012).
60. Crosby, 530 U.S. at 371-72.
61. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 45 (1st Cir. 1999), aff'd sub
nom. Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000).
62. Crosby, 530 U.S. at 386-88; see also Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, Inc. v.
Giannoulias, 523 F. Supp. 2d 731, 748 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (discussing whether the market
participant exception applies in Foreign Commerce Clause cases and noting a split in
authority).
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Thus, while a state law that attempted to promote a boycott of Israel
would violate the Foreign Commerce Clause, State Anti-Boycott Laws are
not implicated by the Foreign Commerce Clause and are protected by the
market participant exception under the Dormant Commerce Clause. This
leaves us with the final substantive constitutional challenge to the State
Anti-Boycott Laws: The "Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine."
III. STATE ANTI-BOYCOTT LAWS AND THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL
CONDITIONS DOCTRINE

The analysis of State Anti-Boycott Laws under the Commerce Clause
was a straightforward review of Commerce Clause principles not
dependent on an understanding of the underlying activity that prompted the
enactment of the laws.
However, analysis of the laws under the
Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, which prohibits the government
from conditioning the receipt of a benefit on the foregoing of a
constitutionally protected right, 63 requires an understanding of the activities
of the BDS Movement that prompted enactment of the laws.
A.

Backgroundon the BDS Movement as the Impetus for the State AntiBoycott Laws.

The impetus for enactment of State Anti-Boycott Laws was the rise of
the BDS Movement and its discriminatory campaign against Israel and
Jews generally. Some of the State Anti-Boycott Laws are silent as to the
connection between the law and the BDS Movement, while others
explicitly reference BDS activity.64 Indiana, for example, made the
following legislative findings when enacting its law:
(4) The fundamental principles of the United States are offended by
attempts to:

(A) delegitimize Israel's existence;
(B) demonize the Jewish state; or
(C) undermine the Jewish people's right to self determination; through
an international campaign to boycott, divest from, or sanction Israel.

63. See Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 674 (1996) (citing Perry v.
Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972)).
64. See, e.g., 37 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 37-2.6-2 (Supp. 2016) (defining "boycott" as a
refusal to deal based on, among other things, national origin, but there are no references to
Israel or BDS); but cf N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:18A-89.13 to -89.14 (West Supp. 2017)
(stating that it is the policy of New Jersey to oppose BDS, and that the law explicitly applies
to boycotts against Israel and Israeli companies).
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(5) Efforts to promote an international campaign to boycott, divest from, or
sanction Israel:
(A) increasingly occur on college and university campuses nationwide,
leading to a climate of intimidation, fear, and violence on campuses in

Indiana;
(B) disproportionately harm thousands of Palestinian workers
employed by Israeli owned firms; and
(C) are antithetical and deeply damaging to the cause of peace, justice,
equality, democracy, and human rights for all people in the Middle
East.
(6) The federal Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and
Accountability Act of 2015 ... specifies principal negotiating objectives

regarding commercial partnerships of the United States in negotiation of a
transatlantic trade and investment partnership agreement, as follows:
(A) To discourage actions by potential trading partners that prejudice
or discourage commercial activity solely between the United States and
Israel.
(B) To discourage politically motivated actions to boycott, divest from,
or sanction Israel.
(C) To seek elimination of politically motivated nontariff barriers on
Israeli goods, services, or other commerce imposed on the Jewish state
of Israel.
(D) To seek elimination of state sponsored unsanctioned foreign
actions to boycott, divest from, or sanction Israel or compliance65 with
the Arab League boycott of Israel by prospective trading partners.
Arkansas's law has a more explicit legislative finding, stating,
"Companies that refuse to deal with United States trade partners such as
Israel, or entities that do business with or in such countries, make
discriminatory decisions on the basis of national origin .... ,66
In its
legislative findings, California went so far as to find that claims of First
Amendment protection for BDS Movement boycott activity are nothing
more than a pretext for discrimination against Jews. 6 The State of New

65. IND. CODEANN. § 5-10.2-11-1 (West 2017).
66. ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-1-501(3) (West, Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.).
67. Act of Sept. 24, 2016, §§ (f), (j), 2016 Cal. Stat. 4023, 4025 (West 2016) (codified
at CAL. PUB. CONT. CODE § 2010 historical and statutory notes)) ("(f) The exercise of one's
First Amendment rights is not a justification for engaging in acts of unlawful
discrimination.... () It is the intent of the Legislature to ensure that taxpayer funds are not
used to do business with or otherwise support any state or private entity that engages in
discriminatory actions against individuals under the pretext of exercising First Amendment
rights. This includes, but is not limited to, discriminatoryactions taken against individuals
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Jersey made a similar legislative finding that BDS activity is a nationalitybased boycott and is thus discriminatory.68
State Regulators have had ample reason to deem BDS Movement
activity discriminatory. Under the most charitable version of its history,
the BDS Movement is the child of the longstanding Arab League boycott
of Israel and the toxic anti-Semitism of Iran and radical elements of the
Arab world. 69 Former Congressman Tom Lantos, the founder of the
Congressional Human Rights Caucus, was present at the conference that
led to the creation of the BDS Movement and described it as "an antiAmerican, anti-Israeli circus" at which there were "transparent attempt[s]
to de-legitimize
the moral argument for Israel's existence as a haven for
7
Jews.",

0

The goal of the BDS Movement is not, as some have claimed, to
promote civil rights.
Rather, the BDS Movement was created to
complement Arab state military action to destroy Israel as a Jewish state.
Omar Barghouti, the co-founder of the BDS Movement, has made public
statements that suggest the goal of BDS is to create a "one-state" solution
that "end[s] Israel's existence. 71
'
The BDS Movement openly and
repeatedly rejects the right of Israel to exist as an independent state, 2 and
even prominent critics of Israel, such as Norman Finkelstein, concede that
the goal of the BDS Movement is the destruction of Israel:
They don't want Israel. They think they're being very clever. They
call it their three tiers .... We want the end of the occupation, we want the

right of return, and we want equal rights for Arabs in Israel. And they
think they are very clever, because they know the result of implementing
all three is what? What's the result? You know and I know what's the
result: there's no Israel.73
Middle East peace advocates also have disputed the claim that BDS is
a rights movement and have criticized the discriminatory aims of

of the Jewish faith under the pretext of a constitutionallyprotected boycott or protest of the
State of Israel." (emphasis added)).
68. N.J. STAr. ANN. § 52:18A-89.13.

69. See Kontorovich Testimony, supra note 12, at 2-3.
70. Tom Lantos, The DurbanDebacle: An Insider's View of the UN World Conference
Against Racism, 26 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 31, 32, 37 (2002).
71. See Ali Mustafa, "Boycotts Work": An Interview with Omar Barghouti,ELECTRONIC

(May 31, 2009), https://perma.cc/B2HK-QAWV.
72. See, e.g., Ali Abunimah et al., The One State Declaration, ELECTRONIC INTIFADA
(Nov. 29, 2007), https://perma.cc/3UFL-XNPZ.
INTrFADA

73. Ali Abunimah, Opinion, Finkelstein, BDS and the Destruction of Israel, AL

(Feb. 28, 2012), https://perma.cc/TX4R-8AA4 (quoting an interview with Norman
Finkelstein).
JAZEERA
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movement. Scholars for Peace in the Middle East noted ties between the
BDS Movement and Hamas and concluded that:
A careful look at the BDS movement and its methodology shows not
legitimate criticism but a movement that is racist and anti-Semitic....
Overall, the BDS campaign is contrary to the search for peace, since it
represents a form of misguided economic warfare. It is directly in
opposition to decades of agreements between Israeli and Arab Palestinians,
in which both sides pledged to negotiate a peaceful settlement and a
commitment to a two state solution ....

74

The BDS Movement was not only founded with the discriminatory
goal of eliminating the State of Israel because of its Jewish nature, it has
been promoted and supported by individuals and groups committed to the
spread of hate and named as designated terror organizations by the United
States. Founding members of the BDS Movement include the Palestine
Liberation Organization and five designated terror organizations, including
Hamas, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and the
Palestinian Islamic Jihad, 7 and there has been testimony before Congress
to that effect:
In the case of three organizations that were designated, shut down, or held
civilly liable for providing material support to the terrorist organization
Hamas, a significant contingent of their former leadership appears 7to6 have
pivoted to leadership positions within the American BDS campaign.
In subsequent testimony before Congress, additional information was
provided regarding funding and strategic ties between the BDS Movement
and the Palestine Liberation Organization. That testimony demonstrated
that the Palestine Liberation Organization's treasury is likely the key
source of BDS Movement funding and that the Palestine Liberation
Organization coordinates BDS activity worldwide.
74. Israel's War with Hamas Reinvigorates BDS Movement, SCHOLARS FOR PEACE
EAST (Sept. 11, 2014), https://perma.cc/ZLH8-G9HB; see also THE THIRD
NARRATXE, AMEINU, WHAT'S THE PROBLEM WITH BDS?
75. See Foreign Terrorist Organizations, U.S. DEP'T STATE, https://perma.cc/3L3RGC24 (listing Hamas, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and the Palestinian
Islamic Jihad as Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations).
76. Israel Imperiled: Threats to the Jewish State: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm.
MIDDLE

on Terrorism, Nonproliferation,& Trade and the Subcomm. on the Middle E. & N. Afr. of

the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 114th Cong. 23 (2016) (statement of Dr. Jonathan
Schanzer, Vice President of Research, Foundation for Defense of Democracies) [hereinafter
Schanzer Testimony].
77. Israel, the Palestinians, and the United Nations: Challenges for the New
Administration: Joint HearingBefore the Subcomm. on the Middle E. & N. Afr. and the
Subcomm. on Afr., Glob. Health, Glob. Human Rights, & Int'l Orgs. of the H. Comm. on
Foreign Affairs, 115th Cong. 42-43 (2017) (statement of Dr. Jonathan Schanzer, Senior
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In the United States, the BDS Movement is an ideological umbrella
under which several affiliated groups operate. Among those are Students
for Justice in Palestine (SJP) and the Muslim Students' Association. SJP is
a university-based group, co-founded by American Muslims for Palestine
(AMP) chairman Hatem Bazian and former Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine member Senan Shaqdeh. 8 SJP promotes BDS
activity across American university campuses. Much of the leadership is
interconnected with AMP.80 SJP chapters frequently violate university
policies and have been banned or suspended from several university
campuses as a result.8' A study of the group by NGO Monitor found that,
while individual SJP chapters operate autonomously with their own
constitutions and funding sources, and frequently without carrying the
"Students for Justice in Palestine" name, they nonetheless receive funding
from groups like AMP through their affiliation with SJP. 8 2 NGO Monitor
noted that "due to a fundamental lack of transparency on the part of SJP
and its donors, only a fraction of SJP's funding is known and publicly
accessible," making it difficult to know exactly how much funding SJP
chapters are receiving from sources outside of their own universities.83
These BDS Movement affiliates propagate hate and discrimination
that is thinly veiled as anti-Israel activism.8 4 AMP provides significant

Vice President for Research, Foundation for Defense of Democracies). "[The Palestinian
National Fund] reportedly pays the salaries of the [PLO's] members, as well as students,
who received tens of millions of dollars in support of BDS activities each year ....
PLO

operatives in Washington, DC are reportedly involved in coordinating the activities of
Palestinian students in the U.S. who receive funds from the PLO to engage in BDS activism.
This, of course, suggests that the BDS movement is not a grassroots activist movement, but
rather one that is heavily influenced by PLO-sponsored persons." Id.
78. Caroline B. Glick, Column One: Defeating Hamas in America, JERUSALEM POST
(Apr. 27, 2016 10:34 PM), https://perma.cc/UP8S-74A7.
79. See Alex Kane, Despite Attacks, National Conference Unites Students for Justice in
Palestine, ELECTRONIC INTIFADA (Oct. 21, 2011), https://perma.cc/2A5W-V5TM.
80. See ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, PROFILE: AMERICAN MUSLIMS FOR PALESTINE
(2013) [hereinafter AMERICAN MUSLIMS FOR PALESTINE]; see also ANTI-DEFAMATION
LEAGUE, PROFILE: STUDENTS FOR JUSTICE IN PALESTINE 3 (2014). As noted above, Hatem
Bazian, a founder of Students for Justice in Palestine, is also a founder of American
Muslims for Palestine. Glick, supra note 78.
81. Most recently, the SJP chapter at the University of California, Irvine was suspended
for a period of two years. See Student Conduct Review RegardingIncident of May 10, 2017,
UCI OFFICE OF INCLUSIVE EXCELLENCE, https://perma.cc/59PD-6UR6.
82. YONA A. SCHIFFMILLER, NGO MONITOR, BDS ON AMERICAN CAMPUSES: SJP AND
ITS NGO NETWORK 1 (2015).
83. Id.; see also, Chiaramonte, supranote 15.
84. The question of what distinguishes legitimate criticism of Israel's policies from
veiled anti-Semitism is one that has been debated for decades. Some, such as Reverend
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levels of support for the Muslim Students' Association.85
SJP has
extensive ties with former backers and officials of the now-defunct Holy
Land Foundation for Relief and Development (HLF), an entity controlled
by individuals who were convicted of providing material support to
Hamas-a designated foreign terrorist organization.8 6 AMP functions both
as a direct promoter of BDS activity in the United States and as a
quasi-parent organization to other BDS promoters.8 In a 2013 report, the
Anti-Defamation League chronicled the numerous ties between former
HLF officials and founding members of AMP:
AMP has its organizational roots in the now-defunct Islamic Association of
Palestine (IAP), an anti-Semitic group that served as the main propaganda
arm for Hamas in the United States. AMP's inaugural conference in
November 2006, titled, "Palestine-A Just Cause," in Rosemont, Illinois
featured several former IAP leaders, including Rafeeq Jaber, a former IAP
president; Kifa Mustapha, a former IAP board member and head of the
Holy Land Foundation's Chicago office; Osama Abu Irshaid, an AMP
board member and former editor of IAP's official newspaper; Nihad Awad,
former IAP public relations director and current executive director of the
Council on American-Islamic
Relations (CAIR); and Raed Tayeh, a former
88
IAP member ....
lAP was prosecuted alongside the HLF and ultimately held civilly
liable for supporting Hamas.89 In addition to Hatem Bazian, the leadership
of AMP includes a number of high profile extremists with ties to Hamas
and other terrorist organizations.90

Martin Luther King, Jr., have stated that anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism are one and the
same. See, e.g., Seymour Martin Lipset, "The Socialism of Fools": The Left, the Jews &
Israel, ENCOUNTER MAG., Dec. 1969, at 24 (quoting Martin Luther King, Jr.: "When people
criticize Zionists, they mean Jews. You're talking anti-Semitism!"). Others have a more
nuanced view of when the line between criticism and racism is crossed. See generally
Kenneth L. Marcus, Anti-Zionism as Racism: Campus Anti-Semitism and the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 15 WM. & MARY BILL Rrs. J. 837, 837-39 (2007). Even under a nuanced view
of the question, it is clear that the BDS Movement's goal of eliminating the modem state of
Israel can't be considered a form of legitimate criticism of Israel.
85. FAQs, AM. MUSLIMS FOR PALESTINE, https://perma.cc/E293-QLQQ.
86. See Schanzer Testimony, supra note 76, at 25-27.
87. See id.
88. AMERICAN MUSLIMS FOR PALESTINE, supra note 80, at 3.
89. Schanzer Testimony, supra note 76, at 27.
90. See id. at 27-30. Among those identified in the preceding sources as leaders of
AMP are Osama Abuirshaid, who was the editor of Al Zaytounah, the official newspaper of
the IAP; Rafeeq Jaber, a former president of the AMP; and Salah Sarsour, a member of
AMP's board of directors who reportedly spent eight months in jail in Israel for Hamas
activity. Id. at 27-29.
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NGO Monitor has also investigated AMP and detailed its support for
SJP through production of media and activism guidebooks; AMP has
similarly supported campus activities by providing speakers for SJP
campus events, publicizing campus events on its website and through social
media, and organizing workshops and conferences. 91 NGO Monitor found
that AMP "accuses Israel of 'apartheid,' and advocates for a 'right of
return' and the elimination of Israel," and quoted the group as saying,
"Palestinians are more determined than ever to fight on until total
liberation, until every refugee
can return, until the land of Palestine is free
92
from the river to the sea!",
The Muslim Students' Association (MSA) was founded by the
Muslim Brotherhood in 1963. 9' It now has nearly 600 chapters on North
American campuses and is active in sponsoring conferences, speakers,
publications, and websites. 94 Part of its primary focus is the promotion of
radical Islamic ideology and BDS on university campuses. 95 After
conducting a thorough investigation, the New York Police Department
issued a report that deemed the MSA an "incubator" for radical Islamist
activity.96

In 2010, journalist Patrick Poole detailed deep ties between the MSA
and terror organizations, providing a list of individuals who had been active
in MSA's university chapters and later charged with or convicted for
terrorist activities. 9 For instance, "Former University of Arizona MSA
president, Wael Hamza Julaidan... has the distinction of being one of al-

Qaeda's co-founders and its logistics chief."98

Anwar Al-Aulaqi was

91. American Muslims for Palestine (AMP), NGO MONITOR (Aug. 27, 2017),
https://perma.cc/H7KY-XT2T [hereinafter NGO Monitor on AMP]; see also American
Muslims for Palestine's Web of Hamas Support, INVESTIGATIVE PROJECT ON TERRORISM
(Dec. 14, 2011), https://perma.cc/KV3L-YWWV.
92. NGO Monitor on AMP, supra note 91.
93. Noreen S. Ahmed-Ullah et al., A Rare Look at Secretive Brotherhoodin America,
CHICAGO TRIBUNE (Sept. 19, 2004), https://perma.cc/SJR6-CGRN.
94. See MUSLIM STUDENTS ASSOCIATION, INVESTIGATIVE PROJECT ON TERRORISM.
95. See generally id
96. MITCHELL D. SILBER & ARVIN BHATT, NYPD INTELLIGENCE DIVISION,
RADICALIZATION IN THE WEST: THE HOMEGROWN THREAT 68 (2007). This 2007 report was
initially published online, but as a result of a lawsuit, the New York City Police Department
was ordered to remove the report. Stipulation of Settlement and Order at 4, Raza v. City of
New York, No. 13-CV-3448 (E.D.N.Y. 2017).
97. Patrick Poole, The Muslim Student Association's Terror Problem, PJ MEDIA (Aug.
20, 2010), https://perma.cc/N8RR-N9MH.
98. Id.
"He was listed as a specially designated global terrorist by the U.S.
government[,]" which identified him as "a close associate of Osama bin Laden and other
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another notable member who served as the chaplain for the George
Washington University MSA and "reportedly played a role in the Ft. Hood
massacre, the failed Christmas Day underwear bomber plot, and the recent
attempted Times Square bombing."99
Aafia Siddiqui, who was
"convicted... of attempted murder of a U.S. Army captain while she was
incarcerated and being interrogated by authorities at a prison in
Afghanistan," reportedly wrote a guide for the national organization to
distribute to its members.' 00 And, Omar Hammami, a top official of the alQaeda-linked Somali terrorist group al-Shabaab, "served as president of the
MSA chapter at the University of South Alabama in 2001 and 2002."'11
al-Qaeda leaders" and director of the Rabita Trust, a "designated terrorist finance entity"
providing logistical and financial support to al-Qaeda. Id. (emphasis added).
99. Id.
100. Id. "A 2005 article in Vogue, which speculated that Siddiqi's [sic] radicalization
began with her association with the MSA, noted that Siddiqi [sic] had authored a guide
published by the national MSA organization that encouraged MSA members not to water
down Islamic doctrine-particularly on the topics of jihad and the treatment of women,
saying that perseverance was needed until 'America becomes a Muslim land."' Id.
"According to news reports, she had been captured in 2008 with explosives, deadly
chemicals, and a list of New York City landmarks. Described as 'alQaeda's Mata Hari' and
'Lady al-Qaeda,' Siddiqui was active in the MSA at MIT, where she studied neuroscience."
Id.
101. Id. Poole identified other radicalized members of MSA chapters. Tarek Mehanna,
a self-proclaimed former MSA official at the Massachusetts College of Pharmacy and
Health Science, faced charges for providing material support to terrorists. Id. "Ali Asad
Chandia, who was convicted in June 2006 on terror charges as part of the Northern Virginia
jihad network, had previously served as president of the Montgomery College (MD) MSA
in 1998 and 1999. He was sentenced to 15 years in prison for convictions on three separate
counts of conspiracy and material support to the Pakistani Lashkar-e-Taiba terrorist group."
Id. "Abdurahman Alamoudi, who served as MSA national president in 1982 and 1983, is
currently serving a 23-year prison sentence for his extensive international terrorist activities.
Once the most prominent Muslim political activist in the country, and counselor to U.S.
presidents and cabinet officials, the U.S. government now claims that he was one of alQaeda's top fundraisers." Id. "Howard University dental student Rainy Zamzam and four
other D.C.-area men were arrested in Pakistan and charged with plotting to join the
Jaish-e-Muhammed terrorist group with plans to attack U.S. soldiers in Afghanistan. The
five were active in the MSA, but Zamzam served as the president of the MSA's D.C.
Council. They were convicted in a Pakistani court..." Id Syed Maaz Shah, the secretary
of the MSA at the University of Texas-Dallas in December 2006, was arrested for his
involvement in conducting paramilitary training at an Islamic campground and intention to
fight United States troops with the Taliban. Id. "Shah had posted comments on the UTD
MSA's website praising insurgents killing troops in Iraq and posting links to terrorist
videos." Id. "Al-Qaeda's chief procurement agent in the U.S. during the 1990s, Ziyad
Khaleel, was also the president of the Columbia College (MO) MSA. A computer science
student, he also registered and operated the English-language website for the Hamas
terrorist organization." Khaleel, who also regularly lectured at the University of Missouri
MSA as a representative of the Islamic Association for Palestine (a Hamas front), was
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In a 2015 Washington Times op-ed, journalist David Horowitz
described the MSA and SJP as the two leading campus organizations
promoting BDS activity in the United States. 0 2 While the groups claim to
simply be a rights-based organizations seeking peace and justice, it is clear
that the founders and leaders have ties to groups designated by the United
States government as terrorist organizations and one of the primary
objectives of some of the groups is to normalize discrimination against
Israel. 03 Clearly, one can support boycotts against Israel without being
complicit in the BDS Movement's discriminatory campaign, but the vast
majority of current boycott campaigns against Israel are affiliated with the
BDS Movement. 0 4 Individuals who participate in these groups and BDS
activities without knowledge of the discriminatory intent may be, as
Vladimir Lenin is reported to have called liberals, "useful idiots"'' 0 5 to the
BDS Movement, but the laws that prohibit discriminatory boycott activity
apply to them with the same force as they apply to those who
masterminded the campaigns.
One can analogize the BDS Movement supporters to the activists in
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project.0 6 In that case, a group sought to
assist designated foreign terror organizations in developing advocacy and
legal strategies to advance their goals. The assistance was, on its face,
entirely non-violent. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court found that federal
law prohibiting material support (i.e., the provision of advisory support and
engaging in activism favorable) to foreign terror organizations did not
violate the constitutional rights of the activists, even if the support was
intended to be used only for purportedly humanitarian activities of the

tasked by a top al-Qaeda operative in 1996 to purchase a $7,500 satellite phone for Osama
bin Laden. Over the next two years he purchased a spare battery for the phone and at least
2000 airtime minutes. The phone, dubbed by intelligence authorities as the 'jihad phone,'
was used to plan the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings." Id.
102. David Horowitz, Opinion, When Students Cheer Jihad,WASH. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2015.
103. See generally Greendorfer, supra note 10. The author argues that BDS Movement

activity violates a number of federal laws, including the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act with a material support to designated terror organizations predicate. Id
at 106-09. This is not to argue that each participant in BDS Movement activity is as
culpable as the leadership; indeed, it is very likely the case that there are many unsuspecting
BDS participants who believe the leadership's claims that BDS is a rights movement.
104. See Recent Legislation-First Amendment-Political Boycotts-South Carolina
Disqualifies Companies Supporting BDS from Receiving State Contracts.-S.C. Code Ann.
§ 11-33-5300 (2015), 129 HARV. L. REv. 2029, 2030 (2016) [hereinafter HLR Note]; see,
e.g., IOWA CODE § 12J.1 (2017) (discussing the legislative findings behind Iowa's State
Anti-Boycott Law).
105. See William Safire, On Language, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Apr. 12, 1987.
106. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010).
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foreign organization. 10 7 Just as in Humanitarian Law Project, BDS
activists may claim their support is intended only for the non-violent
activities of the entities that serve as the minence grise of the BDS
Movement, but that does not upend the constitutionality of the applicable
law.
B.

The UnconstitutionalConditions Doctrine

Under the "'unconstitutional conditions' doctrine... the government
'may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his
constitutionally protected ... freedom of speech' even if he has no
entitlement to that benefit ....
,108 Assuming arguendo that the types of
transactions affected by State Anti-Boycott Laws are benefits that
otherwise would be subject to the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine,
the threshold question is whether BDS Movement boycott activity is
constitutionally protected free speech. Given the background on the BDS
Movement presented in Section III.A, it is clear that the Unconstitutional
Conditions Doctrine is not implicated by the State Anti-Boycott Laws.
1.

The FirstAmendment Argument of BDS Proponents.

In an unsigned "Recent Legislation" update in a 2016 volume of the
Harvard Law Review (HLR Note), the author of the note argued that South
Carolina's No Contracts Law violated First Amendment rights and was
invalid under the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine. 10 9 The note states

107. Id. at 39.
108. Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 674 (1996) (quoting Perry v.
Sindermanm, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972)).
But see Cass R. Sunstein, Why the
Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine Is an Anachronism (with ParticularReference to
Religion, Speech, and Abortion), 70 B.U. L. REv. 593 (1990) (thoroughly discussing the

doctrine and arguments for its elimination). Professor Sunstein rightly notes:
The Constitution offers no general protection against the imposition of penalties

on the exercise of rights. Instead, the question the Constitution ordinarily makes it
necessary to ask whether government has intruded on a right in a way that is
constitutionally troublesome and, if so, whether government can justify its
intrusion under the appropriate standard of review.
Id. at 603.
109. HLR Note, supra note 104, at 2031. It is important to note that even though the
South Carolina No Contracts Law never mentions BDS or Israel, the HLR Note presumes
that the law is aimed at BDS Movement boycotts and applies specifically to BDS activity.
Id. at 2030 ("Though the law applies to boycotts of any of the state's trading partners,
legislators made clear that they were targeting BDS."). This presumption bolsters this
Article's assertion that the boycotts against Israel in the United States are overwhelmingly
affiliated with the BDS Movement, and the nature of the BDS Movement-including its
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that BDS Movement boycotts are political boycotts entitled to the highest
level of First Amendment protection. 110 To support this conclusion, the
note misreads and distorts NAACP v. ClaiborneHardware Co.'11
Claiborne is a civil rights-era case that arose from the boycotting of
businesses by African Americans asserting their civil rights against the
owners of those businesses and the local government, which had deep ties
to those businesses. 112 The Supreme Court found the boycott activity to be
political in nature and thus protected by the First Amendment." 3 This
point cannot be over-emphasized, and the Court made explicit mention of it
in a footnote: the objects of the boycott were people and entities directly
tied to the suppression and infringement of the constitutional rights of the
4
boycotting African Americans. 1
The boycotters in Claiborne were engaging in the ultimate expression
of political speech-taking direct economic action against those depriving
them of rights. The connection between the boycotters, the boycotted, and
the grievance were all of a primary order. BDS Movement boycotts are
secondary and tertiary, rather than primary, since there is no direct
connection between those in the United States engaging in the boycotts, on
the one hand, and those subject to the disputed policies of Israel, on the
other hand.
The HLR Note ignores that Claiborne did not-and has never in
subsequent decisions been found to-stand for the proposition that all
boycott activities enjoy the same protection under the First Amendment.
Indeed, contrary to the characterization in the HLR Note that Claiborne
"categorically extends First Amendment protection to political boycotts,""' '
the Claiborne Court explicitly acknowledged that a number of different
discriminatory origins and nature-are intimately tied to the legal analysis of the State AntiBoycott Laws.

110. See id. at 2032.
111.

NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982).

112. See id.
at 888.
113. Id. at 915 (holding that the state court could not hold the boycotters liable for
damages arising from their economic boycott).
114. Id. at 889 n.3 ("The affected businesses represented by the merchants included four
grocery stores, two hardware stores, a pharmacy, two general variety stores, a laundry, a
liquor store, two car dealers, two auto parts stores, and a gas station. Many of the owners of
these boycotted stores were civic leaders in Port Gibson and Claiborne County.
Respondents Allen and Al Batten were Aldermen in Port Gibson, Robert Vaughan, part
owner and operator of one of the boycotted stores, represented Claiborne County in the
Mississippi House of Representatives, respondents Abraham and Hay had served on the
school board, respondent Hudson served on the Claiborne County Democratic Committee."
(citations omitted)).
115. HLRNote, supra note 104, at 2031 n.17.
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types of boycotts, some of which may have political elements, were not
covered by the decision. The Court explained:
We need not decide in this case the extent to which a narrowly tailored
statute designed to prohibit certain forms of anticompetitive conduct or
certain types of secondary pressure may restrict protected First Amendment
activity. No such statute is involved in this case. Nor are we presented
with a boycott designed to secure aims that are themselves prohibited by a
valid state law."16
As the author of this Article argued in a previous article published in
2016:
Claiborne does not stand for a blanket First Amendment protection for
any and all boycott activity, especially activity that is in contravention of
United States law and policy and which has only an attenuated nexus to
domestic concerns. The mere fact that there may be some distant and
speculative offshore effect on a foreign conflict from commercial coercion
occasioned by the boycotters who choose to agitate in United States
commercial markets does not vest that activity with First Amendment
protections. The Claiborne ruling was predicated on the boycott being
implemented to vindicate rights "that lie at the heart of the Fourteenth
Amendment itself ... to effectuate rights guaranteed by the Constitution
itself."
To reiterate this point, which is clear in Claiborne but ignored by those
who seek to legitimize BDS Movement activity in the United States, the
Claiborne Court specifically tied First Amendment protections for boycott
activity to the effect that the underlying boycott would have on the
assertion of Fourteenth Amendment rights of those engaging in the boycott.
Whatever one may think of the conflict between the State of Israel and
Palestinian Arabs, it is not an issue governed by the Fourteenth
Amendment or any other provision of the United States Constitution; the
rights of the parties involved are outside the scope and reach of United
States' laws. Thus, BDS Movement boycott activity in the United States is
not covered by the protections afforded under Claiborne.117
And, in fact, in InternationalLongshoremen's Association v. Allied
International,Inc.,118 a case decided in the same year as Claiborne, the
Supreme Court upheld a law regulating boycott activity directed at a matter
of foreign affairs.1 9 InternationalLongshoremen's Association shows that,

116. Claiborne, 458 U.S. at 915 n.49 (citing Hughes v. Superior Court of Cal., 339 U.S.
460 (1950)).
117. BDS and the First Amendment, supra note 8, at 115-16.
118. Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Allied Int'l, Inc., 456 U.S. 212 (1982).
119. See id. 226-27 (finding that secondary boycotts in the United States directed at
foreign companies to pressure a foreign country to change its policies were not protected
speech under the First Amendment). The CRS BDS Report acknowledges that there are
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contrary to the HLR Note's erroneous reading of the case, Claiborne
clearly does not stand for the proposition that all boycotts with a political
element receive the highest levels of First Amendment protections.
The Congressional Research Service repeated, in part, the HLR Note's
120
erroneous First Amendment analysis in its recent report on BDS.
Whatever else one may say about BDS Movement boycotts, it can't be said
that they are of the same nature as the boycotts in Claiborne. BDS
Movement boycotts are much more similar to the boycotts in International
Longshoremen 's. Nor can it be said that the State Anti-Boycott Laws pose
any risk of chilling political speech, as the HLR Note and the CRS BDS
Report each argue, since actual speech and legitimate expressive conduct
are not affected by the laws.

characteristics that distinguish the protected boycott in Claibornefrom the BDS Movement,
which might factor into a reviewing court's analysis as to whether BDS activity is similarly
protected by the Constitution. CRS BDS REPORT, supra note 26, at 15. While the CRS
BDS Report raises the possibility that InternationalLongshoremen's Association is limited

to law regulating labor activity and notes that the Claiborne opinion carved out such laws, it
ignores the fact that the Claiborne opinion also carved out laws relating to secondary
boycotts (which is the best categorization for BDS Movement boycotts). Id. at 17-18. The
CRS BDS Report also conveniently ignored the Claiborne Court's language of "[n]or are
we presented with a boycott designed to secure aims that are themselves prohibited by a
valid state law" as well as the fact that anti-discrimination laws (which is the proper
characterization of the State Anti-Boycott Laws) have repeatedly been found to be valid
state laws.

Claiborne, 458 U.S. at 915 n.49.

Thus, International Longshoremen's

Association is precise precedent for upholding the constitutionality of the State Anti-Boycott
Laws and distinguishing BDS Movement activity from the protected protest activity in
Claiborne.

120. CRS BDS REPORT, supra note 26, at 14-15. ("However, boycotts aimed at
achieving something other than an economic advantage, particularly when the motivation is
political or social in nature, may have more of an expressive element which, according to
Supreme Court precedent, could qualify for First Amendment protection.... While
recognizing the government had considerable power to restrict economically motivated
boycotts, the Court in Claiborne Hardware held that the 'right of the States to regulate
economic activity could not justify a complete prohibition against a nonviolent, politically
motivated boycott designed to force governmental and economic change and to effectuate
rights guaranteed by the Constitution itself.' It may be argued that, like the Claiborne
Hardware boycotters, BDS participants' intent is to cause economic harm, but their aim is
not to destroy competition. Instead, BDS proponents' stated aim is to place pressure on
Israel to make desired policy changes. Moreover, the BDS participants might claim that
their activity is non-violent and politically motivated, designed to force governmental
change. Following that reasoning, it might be argued that their activity should receive a
similar degree of protection under the First Amendment as the boycott at issue in Claiborne
Hardware." (footnotes omitted)). The CRS BDS Report did, however, incorporate the
argument the author of this Article made in BDS and the First Amendment, supra note 8, at
116, regarding the inapplicability of Claiborne's protections to BDS. See CRS BDS
REPORT, supra note 26, at 15-16.
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The BDS Movement was formed to oppose the existence of the State
of Israel, which the BDS Movement terms a "colonial" entity that has
usurped the rights of Palestinian Arabs. 12 '
The BDS Movement
acknowledges that its boycott activity is of a secondary or tertiary nature,
meant to inflict economic harm on Israeli companies and thus, presumably,
force them to put pressure on the government of Israel. 122 In both
Claiborne and International Longshoremen's Association, the Supreme

Court explicitly stated that secondary boycotts are not accorded the23same
types of protections under the First Amendment as primary boycotts. 1
Even if we accept the claim that BDS is a campaign to change the way
the government of Israel treats Palestinian Arabs, this goal is utterly
disconnected from the companies subject to BDS Movement boycotts, as
they are private-not government-controlled-companies. For example,
an American real estate company that does business internationally,
124
including in Israel, has been targeted by BDS Movement boycotters.
American real estate companies have absolutely no power to change the
policies of the government of Israel, yet these, and
other private companies,
25
are primary targets of BDS Movement boycotts. 1

121. The organizing document of the BDS Movement, posted on the BDS Movement's
website, is an unsigned document titled Towards a Global Movement: A Framework for
Today's Anti-Apartheid Activism. GRASSROOTS PALESTINIAN ANTI-APARTHEID WALL
CAMPAIGN, TOWARDS A GLOBAL MOVEMENT (2007) [hereinafter BDS CHARTER]. The BDS
Charter describes Israel as a colonial and racist occupier of Palestinian lands. Id. at viii
("The outbreak of the second Intifada brought us back to the fact that our struggle remains a
struggle against colonialism, racism and expulsion.").
122. The BDS Charter notes the rise of Israel's economic fortunes in the past several
decades and then spends fifteen pages on a detailed analysis of each major sector of Israel's
economy, from agriculture to technology to military to tourism, and concludes with a
directed call for a global attack on commercial entities in Israel:
The effectiveness of any programme of sanctions aimed at a country's foreign
trade will depend upon the degree of dependence of its economy on trade with the
rest of the world. Israel ... has a vulnerable and volatile economy that could feel
the impact of coordinated BDS campaigns.
Id. at 161.
123. Claiborne, 458 U.S. at 912 ("Secondary boycotts and picketing by labor unions
may be prohibited .. "); Int 7 Longshoremen's Ass 'n, 456 U.S. at 226-27 (holding that a
law prohibiting secondary boycotts did not violate the First Amendment and stating, "It
would seem even clearer that conduct designed not to communicate, but to coerce, merits
still less consideration under the First Amendment.").
124. Ben Norton, Boycott RE/MAX ProtestsFlood the US During Week of Action, BDS
(Dec. 9, 2014), https://perma.cc/SS9H-35C2.
125. By way of example, the published list of companies targeted for BDS Movement
boycotts includes only one company owned by the government of Israel: Israel Military
Industries. Full List, BDS LIST, https://perma.cc/8AJZ-K5WC.
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Unlike the boycotts in Claiborne, the boycott activity of the BDS
Movement is a mutation of commercial speech that is used as a weapon to
inflict economic harm on third parties who are only tangentially related to
the object of the political speech-the government of Israel. The political
speech element of BDS activity consists of actual speech criticizing the
policies and actions of the government of Israel, which is not subject to the
State Anti-Boycott Laws.
A total ban on boycotts against Israeli
companies would not negatively
impact the speech of those who oppose the
26
1
Israel.
of
government
The boycott activity in Claiborne was properly described as political
speech since the boycotters were personally being deprived of
constitutionally protected rights by the store owners being boycotted. 127 In
that case, the commercial and political became one and the same. The
Supreme Court made this clear in Claiborneby noting that the ruling was
predicated on the fact that the boycotts were undertaken to address
concerns "that lie at the heart of the Fourteenth Amendment itself ....to
effectuate rights guaranteed by the Constitution itself."' 28 There was no
way to separate the boycott from the political speech in Claiborne, as they
had merged into a unified whole.
In the case of BDS Movement activity, however, participants in the
United States are not subject to Israel's control, and Israel is not infringing
on any rights protected under the Constitution, let alone any rights
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. The goal of the BDS Movement
is not to assert the rights of those boycotting; rather it is to inflict economic
harm on a foreign nation for purely extra-territorial reasons by attacking the
economic interests of companies that operate in that foreign nation.
Because those who engage in BDS Movement boycotts are not acting to
protect any right guaranteed by the Constitution from infringement by
those who are being boycotted, BDS Movement boycotts are the essence of
what the Claiborne Court described as "nonviolent and totally voluntary
boycott[s] [that] may have a disruptive effect on local economic
conditions."' 29 With regard to this type of boycott, the Claiborne Court
stated, "This Court has recognized the strong governmental interest in
certain forms of economic regulation, even though such regulation may
have an incidental effect on rights of speech and association." 30

126. See, e.g., Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Inst. Rights, 547 U.S. 47, 67-70 (2006)
(upholding a federal law requiring schools to provide access to military recruiters).
127. Claiborne,458 U.S. at 911.
128. Id. at 914.

129. Id. at 912.
130. Id.
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BDS Movement boycotts should not be viewed as political speech.
Rather, they are economic boycotts that are often, though never
inextricably, linked to the political positions being advocated by adherents
vis-a-vis United States foreign policy. The boycotts are aimed entirely at
third parties to the dispute-parties that have no power to provide redress
to the boycotters. Thus, while some boycotts, such as those in Claiborne,
are expressive conduct that cannot be separated from the underlying
political speech, BDS Movement boycotts can be separated from the
associated political speech.
In his opinion in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia

Citizens Consumer Council, Justice Stewart opined that "[i]deological
expression, be it oral, literary, pictorial, or theatrical, is integrally related to
the exposition of thought-thought that may shape our concepts of the
whole universe of man."''
The converse holds true, as well. Some
ideological expression can be utterly divorced from the exposition of
thought. An economic boycott against companies of a foreign country is
one such ideological expression that can be divorced from the exposition of
disagreement with the government of that foreign country.
The Rumsfeld Court dealt with this specific issue and noted that to
receive the highest level of First Amendment protection, conduct (which
would include boycotting, as well as excluding military recruiters from
campus), must be "inherently expressive," and the expressive component
cannot simply be superfluous speech accompanying the conduct. 3 2 The
conduct in BDS Movement boycotts is actually entirely unrelated to the
purported message of BDS. That is, BDS claims that its speech is meant to
protest the government of Israel, yet the boycott activity is against third
parties that have no control over the actions of the Israeli government.'3 3 If
BDS Movement boycotts were limited solely to boycotts of the Israeli
government, the First Amendment claims of BDS supporters relative to
their boycott activity would have more merit.
One can assert the political position against Israel through protests,
through public speech, and through any number of other means of
communication that do not involve boycotts, all without running afoul of
131. Va. State Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 779
(1976) (extending First Amendment protections to commercially related speech) (Stewart,
J., concurring).
132. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Inst. Rights, 547 U.S. 47, 66 (2006).
133. While the boycotts in Claiborne also targeted private businesses, those businesses
were owned by local political and civic leaders who were infringing the constitutional rights
of the boycotters. Claiborne, 458 U.S. at 889 n.3. This direct connection between the

boycott targets and their complicity in the infringement of the boycotters' rights does not
exist in BDS Movement boycotts.
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the State Anti-Boycott Laws. Because of this, the boycott activity that is
the cornerstone of the BDS Movement can be severed from political speech
critical of Israel. In other words, the secondary and tertiary boycotts
promoted by the BDS Movement are properly characterized as a form of
commercial boycott and, thus, a form of commercial speech, which has far
less robust constitutional protections than political speech. Under the
"participatory model" of First Amendment commercial speech theory, a
BDS Movement boycott is a punitive weapon and nothing more, while a
Claiborne boycott is the classic case of a commercial action that invites
dialogue and discourse on an issue and deserves enhanced First
Amendment protections. 3 4 The State Anti-Boycott Laws are, in fact,
exactly the type of narrowly tailored statutes aimed at boycotts prohibited
by valid state law that the Claiborne Court used as an example for a
situation where the First Amendment would not protect a boycott from
regulation.
The Supreme Court has consistently found that state and federal antidiscrimination laws that relate to race, religion, color, and national origin
do not violate the highest level of First Amendment protections.' 35 In
134. See generally Robert Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48
UCLA L. REv. 1, 12 (2000) ("One theory, which has deeply informed the development of
First Amendment jurisprudence, is the participatory model ... [that] emphasizes the
importance of preserving uncensored access to public discourse so that citizens can maintain
the warranted sense that their government is responsive to them. The participatory model
protects public discourse in order to preserve a necessary (but not sufficient) precondition
for democratic legitimation. Commercial speech, however, does not seem a likely candidate
for inclusion within public discourse, because we most naturally understand persons who
are advertising products for sale as seeking to advance their commercial interests rather than
as participating in the public life of the nation. We do not characterize them as inviting
reciprocal dialogue or discussion; nor do we perceive their speech as an effort to make the
state responsive to them. We instead view them as attempting to sell products." (footnotes
omitted)).
135. See, e.g., Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 549
(1987). This case involved a First Amendment challenge to California's Unruh Act, which
forbade discrimination on the basis of, inter alia, religion and national origin. Id. at 541.
California's Anti-Boycott Law applies the Unruh Act's anti-discrimination provisions to
determine if a boycott is in violation of the Anti-Boycott Law. CAL. PUB. CONT. CODE §
2010(a) (West 2017). Given the extensive and deep ties between the principals of the BDS
Movement and foreign terror organizations, the question of whether restrictions on BDS
activity violates the First Amendment is answered by Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project,
561 U.S. 1, 39 (2015) (finding that a federal statute prohibiting the provision of material
support to terror groups did not violate First Amendment rights). See Grove City Coll. v.
Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 575-76 (1984) (upholding federal anti-discrimination law against a First
Amendment challenge); Christian Legal Soc'y v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 697-98 (2010)
(upholding a public university's non-discrimination policy against a First Amendment
challenge).
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addition, existing federal contracting law explicitly prohibits discrimination
on the basis of, inter alia, race, religion, and national origin. 3 6 It would be
incongruous for a state analog of such a law to fail court review where the
federal law has consistently been upheld.
This is not to say that such laws have no First Amendment
implications; rather, a court must first examine whether a State AntiBoycott Law infringed upon speech (as opposed to conduct) and then
determine the level of scrutiny under which the law is to be examined.
Many laws that regulate activity seen to be odious, such as incitement or
pornography, receive rational basis review, which simply requires that the
state demonstrate that the law is rationally related to a legitimate
government purpose. 137
BDS Movement boycotts are discriminatory campaigns that relate to
foreign affairs over which the objects of the boycotts have utterly no
power. There are no Fourteenth Amendment or other constitutional rights
being asserted by the boycotters. There can be no serious question whether
a state law intended to prevent discrimination is valid. While the HLR
Note implicitly dismissed the discriminatory nature of the BDS Movement
by simply regurgitating, without investigating or questioning, the sanitized
and utterly misleading talking points posted on the BDS Movement's
website, 13 it correctly acknowledged that government action regulating

136. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012).
137. See e.g., Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 571-72 (1991) (finding that
nude dancing is expressive conduct for First Amendment purposes but upholding a state law
regulating erotic dancing establishments under rational basis review); United States v.
Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468 (2010) (noting that certain forms of speech, such as fraud,
obscenity, incitement, and speech integral to criminal conduct, receive no First Amendment
protections at all).

See also Note, Making Sense of Hybrid Speech: A New Model for

Commercial Speech and Expressive Conduct, 118 HARV. L. REv. 2836 (2005) (discussing
intermediate scrutiny under the First Amendment); Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of
the First Amendment: A PreliminaryExploration of ConstitutionalSalience, 117 HARV. L.
REv. 1765 (2004) (noting that many types of speech regulation, such as under antitrust,
securities and labor laws, are not subject to analysis under the First Amendment).
138. HLR Note, supra note 104, at 2029 (describing the BDS Movement as "an
international campaign launched in July 2005 that aims to put economic pressure on the
State of Israel until it meets certain conditions with respect to the Palestinian
people.... BDS leaders do not officially prefer either a one- or two-state solution .... "
(footnote omitted)). In fact, as this Article has documented, the founding documents of the
BDS Movement and leaders of the BDS Movement explicitly call for the elimination of
Israel as a Jewish state, reject a two-state solution, and intend for BDS activity to continue
until Israel ceases to exist, without regard to whether Israel "[m]eets certain conditions with
respect to the Palestinian people." Id. The Congressional Research Service engaged in a
similar act of scholarly malpractice in repeating BDS Movement self-descriptions without
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discriminatory conduct (which is precisely what BDS Movement boycotts
are) would survive First Amendment scrutiny. 3 9 A law regulating speech
that survives First Amendment scrutiny would obviously not be subject to
the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, as no constitutionally protected
rights are infringed by such a law.
In support of the argument that BDS Movement activity is
discriminatory, the International Executive Board of the International
Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement
Workers of America (UAW), one of the country's largest labor unions,
recently had an opportunity to examine the nature of BDS. The union
found that the BDS Movement "espouses discrimination0 and vilification"
of union members who were of Israeli or Jewish origin.14
The words of the UAW speak volumes about the true nature of BDS
and the impact of BDS support:
[T]he local union's BDS Resolution, inherently, targets... Israeli and/or
Jewish members .... [T]his call to action by the local union, in association
with the BDS Resolution, is in disregard of the rights of... members of the
UAW. Moreover, this type of activity is suggestive of discriminatory
labeling and a disparagementof these members.

Similarly, the local union's attempt to address the predicament of
Palestinian people appears to be accomplished through biased targeting of
Israeli/JewishUA W members ....

... [W]e find that the provisions of the BDS Resolution, despite
semantical claims to the contrary by the local union, can easily be
construed as academic and cultural discriminationagainst union members
on the basis of their nationalorigin and religion....

investigating the veracity of the statements or including any counterpoints. CRS BDS
REPORT, supra note 26, at 1.
139. HLR Note, supra note 104, at 2032. The HLR Note was responding to a cogent
argument advanced by Professor Eugene Kontorovich that State Anti-Boycott Laws regulate
discriminatory conduct, much like President Obama's executive order forbidding
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation did. Id. The HLR Note attempted to
distinguish the two laws by claiming that gender or racial discrimination is not expressive
speech (and thus not protected) while engaging in a discriminatory boycott, presumably, is
protected expressive speech, simply because the HLR Note deems the latter to be a political
boycott. Id. Curiously, in the first line of the HLR Note, the author describes BDS activity
as an economic boycott, rather than a political one. Id. at 2029; see also Marcus, supra note
84, for a compelling argument that the anti-Zionist rhetoric at the heart of BDS Movement
activity is properly seen as racial discrimination.
140. INT'L EXEC. BD., UAW, DECISION IN BRUMBAUGH V. UAW LOCAL UNION 2865, at
118 (2015) [hereinafter UAW Appeal].
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...[N]otwithstanding the denotation and connotation of words, it is our
unanimous belief that the notion of BDS, credibly, espouses discrimination
and vilification against Israelis and UAW members who are of Jewish
lineage.... Thus, the local union's platform is apparent in its unfavorable
stance against the state of Israel, Israelis and, invariably, Jewish union

members.141

On this basis, the UAW found that BDS support violates the UAW's
International Constitution's prohibition on discrimination based on race,
142
ethnicity, religion, and national origin.
There is a significant distinction between BDS activity and legitimate
individual protest against Israel, just as such a distinction was found, for
purposes of the federal statute prohibiting the provision of material support
to terrorist groups, between providing material support to a designated
terror group and engaging in independent advocacy for a goal that may
have come into alignment with some of the objects of a designated terror
group. As the Supreme Court noted in HumanitarianLaw Project, where
the material-support-to-terrorism statute was challenged on First
Amendment grounds:
Plaintiffs claim that Congress has banned their "pure political speech." It
has not. Under the material-support statute, plaintiffs may say anything
they wish on any topic. They may speak and write freely about the PKK
and LTTE, the Governments of Turkey and Sri Lanka, human rights, and
international law. They may advocate before the United Nations. As the
Government states: "The statute does not prohibit independent advocacy or
expression of any kind." Section 2339B also "does not prevent [plaintiffs]
from becoming members of the PKK and LTTE or impose any sanction on
them for doing so." Congress has not, therefore, sought to suppress ideas
or opinions in the form of "pure political speech." Rather, Congress has
prohibited "material support," which most often does not take the form of
speech at all. And when it does, the statute is carefully drawn to cover only
a narrow category of speech to, under the direction of, or in coordination
43
with foreign groups that the speaker knows to be terrorist organizations. 1
State Anti-Boycott Laws are of a similar nature. Individuals are free
to boycott Israel and engage in advocacy against Israel. The Court was
exceedingly clear about this point in Humanitarian Law Project, noting
that the law in question did not apply to "[i]ndividuals who act entirely
independently of the foreign terrorist organization to advance its goals or
objectives ....

"'14

The only thing that is subject to regulation under the

141. Id. at 117-18 (emphasis added).
142. Id.at 118.
143. Holder v.Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 25-26 (2010) (citations omitted).

144. Id.
at 23.
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State Anti-Boycott Laws is participation in the discriminatory boycott
campaign fostered by the BDS Movement. And, even then, the only
inhibition on the right to participate in such protest is a restriction on
entering into contracts with the state or having state funds invested in the
participating entity.
Notwithstanding the whitewashing of the history and goals of the BDS
Movement, the boycott activity undertaken by BDS Movement supporters
is comprised of discriminatory intent and impact; it does not enjoy the type
of First Amendment protections provided under Claiborne. As a result,
purported First Amendment considerations do not render the State AntiBoycott Laws violative of the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine.
2.

The UnconstitutionalConditions Doctrine Balancing Test.

Even if First Amendment protections were to apply to the State AntiBoycott Laws, the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine provides a
balancing test to weigh the interests of government, on the one hand,
against the interests of the individual whose speech is being regulated, on
the other. 145 Though the laws do not apply to the political speech of
government employees, the case of Pickering v. Board of Education is

nonetheless applicable.146 The Pickeringbalancing test has been described
as a:
"[B]alance between the interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in
commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as
an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs
through its employees." In striking that balance, we have concluded that
"[t]he government's interest in achieving its goals as effectively and
efficiently as possible is elevated from a relatively subordinate interest

145. For purposes of this Article, we will accept, without agreeing with, the notion that
independent contractors or other persons have a right to the benefit represented by either
entering into a contract with the state or having the state invest state funds in securities
issued by such person. While the argument supporting this notion may have some support
when it comes to existing contracts with a state, the Court has explicitly withheld
application of the holdings to applicants of new contracts. See Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs v.
Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668 (1996); O'Hare Truck Serv., Inc. v. City of Northlake, 518 U.S. 712
(1996) (upholding application of the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine to the
termination of existing contracts with independent contractors). The Supreme Court has not
extended application of the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine to new contracts.
146. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968). While Pickering dealt with the
Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine as applied to public employees, the Umbehr and
O'Hare cases expanded Pickering to the private sector. Umbehr, 518 U.S. at 673 ("We
agree with the Tenth Circuit that independent contractors are protected, and that the
Pickering balancing test, adjusted to weigh the government's interests as contractor rather
than as employer, determines the extent of their protection.").
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when it acts as sovereign to a significant one when it acts as employer."
We have, therefore, "consistently given greater deference to government
predictions of harm used to justify restriction of employee speech than to
predictions of harm used to justify restrictions on the speech of the public
147
at large."'
State Anti-Boycott Laws have been enacted to confront the pernicious
spread of an organized and focused discriminatory campaign. The laws, in
fact, do the minimum that a state is empowered to do to protest
discrimination: forbid the state from contracting with or investing in
companies who choose to engage in discriminatory conduct. The State
Anti-Boycott Laws make a simple but powerful statement to those who
choose to discriminate, while leaving them free to engage in that conduct.
Applying the Pickeringbalancing to the State Anti-Boycott Laws, it is
very unlikely that a business seeking to contract with a state will actually
be foreclosed from participating in protest activity unless that business
obtains the majority of its revenue from state contracts. In such a case,
however, the state has a strong interest in not funding a business if the state
believes that discriminatory BDS activity is incompatible with the interests
of the citizens of that state.
Furthermore, even if prohibited from
contracting with the state, the business remains free to engage in actual
speech (rather than expressive conduct) to oppose Israel.
On the other side of the Pickering balancing test is the potential
societal harm that would come from regulating BDS activity. If we ignore
the long history of discriminatory intent behind the formation and operation
of the BDS Movement and instead view it as a protest movement aimed at
opposing a foreign nation, there is still very little value in protecting
''speech" consisting of boycotting third parties to a conflict solely because
of their dealings in that foreign nation. The typical Pickeringcase involves
individuals who are speaking on a matter of local (or, at least, domestic)
concern, such as the functioning of school districts, public hospitals, or
local law enforcement. 148 Certainly, such speech is valuable and important

147. Umbehr, 518 U.S. at 676 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (quoting Pickering,
391 U.S. at 568; then quoting Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 675 (1994); and then
quoting Waters, 511 U.S. at 673).
148. See e.g., Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983) (involving speech related to the
functioning of a local district attorney's office); Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987)
(concerning a local government employee commenting on the attempted assassination of
President Reagan); Waters, 511 U.S. 661 (concerning a nurse at a public hospital
questioning the efficacy of the hospital's management); City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S.
77 (2004) (concerning a city police officer's sale of pornographic videos in which he
starred); Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006) (concerning a deputy district attorney
disclosing misconduct in the local district attorney's office).
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to the functioning of a robust and healthy democracy. 149 Economic attacks
upon companies that do business in a foreign nation to protest that foreign
nation's policies, however, have remote and nebulous connections to the
interests of a state and its citizens. Political expressions are more
appropriately made through actual speech, which remains unimpeded by
State Anti-Boycott Laws, than economic boycotts of third parties that have
a primary result of harming American consumers and spreading a message
0
of discrimination.15
In sum, because BDS Movement activity is not protected political
speech under the First Amendment, state laws that regulate the
discriminatory activity that is inherent in BDS Movement boycotts are not
in violation of the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine.
CONCLUSION

There are a multitude of reasons why people choose to engage in
boycotts. In most situations, boycotts are indeed legitimate forms of
protest and protected under the Constitution. Generally, one can engage in
boycotts and protests against the State of Israel while still enjoying
constitutional protections. However, when one engages in boycotts that are
fostered and supported by foreign hate groups using the civil rights banner
as cover for a nefarious and discriminatory campaign to inject a foreign
dispute into American communities and commercial markets, those
constitutional protections are not available.
While supporters of the BDS Movement have engaged in a wideranging campaign to sanitize the history and goals of BDS Movement
boycotts, and a number of governmental, educational, and legal bodies
149. See e.g., Victor Brudney, The FirstAmendment and Commercial Speech, 53 B.C. L.
REv. 1153, 1163 (2012) ("[T]he function of the First Amendment is to protect speech that
enables or facilitates the operation, and enriches the quality, of a democratic, open society,
and the role of its members in the collective process of creating and maintaining it. The
special protection of the First Amendment serves to enable individuals to discuss, consider,
and decide how a democratic society should be structured and function .... ").
150. See Greendorfer, supra note 10, at 46-49, 76-81 for a detailed discussion of the
legislative history of the EAA. BDS Movement Boycotts, like the Arab League Boycott of
Israel before them, amount to economic warfare waged by foreign groups against Israel,
using the United States' commercial markets and American consumers as the battlefield. Id.
Far from being political speech, these boycotts are, as Senator Adlai Stevenson said during
the legislative hearings on the EAA, an intrusion "[o]n American sovereignty." Foreign
Investments andArab Boycott Legislation: Hearing on S. 69 andS. 92 Before the Subcomm.
on Int'l Fin. of the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Aff, 95th Cong. 1 (1977).
"[They] interfere[] with basic human rights and religious freedom. [They] impede[] free
competition in the marketplace and systematically enlist[] American citizens against their
will in a war with Israel." Id.
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have become unquestioning conduits for BDS propaganda,' 5 ' a public
relations campaign cannot change underlying facts. These facts are easy to
find, and they demonstrate the true nature of the BDS Movement and its
boycotts. The BDS Movement was founded by a consortium of countries
and organizations devoted to the destruction of Israel, many of whom have
been designated as foreign terror organizations by the United States. The
movement is nothing more than the latest evolution of an intolerant and
bigoted mindset that believes Jews should not have the right to their own
country or self-governance in the lands from which they came. Knowing
that many people in the United States and Europe would not support such a
movement if its true goals were announced, the founders of BDS cloaked
their agenda with the patina of a civil rights movement, co-opted the
language of legitimate civil rights movements from South Africa and the
United States, and found a willing audience of people who have failed to
do basic research into what they are actually supporting.
To the extent there are participants in BDS Movement boycotts who
are unaware of, or unopposed to, the eliminationist goals of BDS, their
presence cannot serve as a prophylactic for the organization's clearly stated
goal of destroying a foreign state by waging a global commercial war on
businesses from that state.
The governors of all fifty states recently signed a statement affirming
opposition to BDS, stating that BDS's "single-minded focus on the Jewish
State raises serious questions about its motivations and intentions."' 5 2 This
unified and universal acknowledgement of the nature of BDS should be
recognized when undertaking a legal analysis of rights associated with
BDS Movement activity.
Opponents of the State Anti-Boycott Laws argue that they have a right
to protest against Israel. The laws in no way infringe upon this right.
Citizens of the State Regulators can still take to the streets to voice their
opinions against Israel, and individuals can, if they so choose, avoid doing
business with Israel. The State Anti-Boycott Laws represent the expression
of the State Regulators' proprietary power to spend or invest state funds in
a manner that reflects the moral and economic interests of the people of
those states.
151. The author of this Article has contacted the authors of the CRS BDS Report to
advise them of material misstatements that were made in the report regarding the nature of
the BDS Movement. These misstatements mirror the talking points of BDS supporters such
as Palestine Legal and the National Lawyers Guild, which falsely portray BDS as a civil
rights movement. As of the date of this Article's publication, the CRS BDS Report's
misstatements remain uncorrected.
152.

Governors

United

Against
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COMMITTEE,

https://www.ajc.org/governors (last visited Dec. 15, 2017).
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Opponents of the State Anti-Boycott Laws claim they only seek to
protect the freedom to boycott and that State Anti-Boycott Laws "chill"
speech. In fact, the only thing that the State Anti-Boycott Laws seek to
chill is discriminatory conduct. The motive and history of the State AntiBoycott Laws are simply to ensure that the states do not enter into
commercial relationships with parties that discriminate. These laws are
common-sense legislative solutions to the unfortunate and harmful spread
of discriminatory hate campaigns that target minority populations. The
laws are narrowly tailored to preserve the rights of the people to speak and
protest while allowing states to avoid involvement in, and funding for,
those who choose to participate in the campaigns.
If opponents of the State Anti-Boycott Laws believe that laws
allowing a state to choose to not enter into contracts with, or make
investments in, those who discriminate will infringe anyone's rights, that
should be taken as an admission that BDS Movement activity is intended to
be discriminatory. Without the State Anti-Boycott Laws, states could be
compelled to enter into financial arrangements with parties who promote
discrimination. It is entirely disingenuous to mischaracterize a hate
movement's agenda as legitimate political speech and then use that
mischaracterization as constitutional cover to force states to provide
financial support for those who support discriminatory campaigns.
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